Cognitive radio is a promising technology for next-generation wireless networks in order to efficiently utilize the limited spectrum resources and satisfy the rapidly increasing demand for wireless applications and services. Security is a very important but not well addressed issue in CR networks. In this article we focus on security problems arising from primary user emulation (PUE) attacks in CR networks. We present a comprehensive introduction to PUE attacks, from the attack rationale and its impact on CR networks, to detection and defense approaches. In order to secure CR networks against PUE attacks, a two-level database-assisted detection approach is proposed to detect such attacks. Energy detection and location verification are combined for fast and reliable detection. An admission-control-based defense approach is proposed to mitigate the performance degradation of a CR network under a PUE attack. Illustrative results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed detection and defense approaches.
IntroductIon
Cognitive radio (CR) is an enabling technology to effectively address the spectrum scarcity, and it will significantly enhance the spectrum utilization of future wireless communications systems. In a CR network, a secondary (or unlicensed) user (SU) is allowed to opportunistically access the spectrum "holes" that are not occupied by a primary (or licensed) user (PU). Generally, SUs constantly observe the spectrum bands by performing spectrum sensing. Once a spectrum hole is discovered, an SU could temporarily transmit on this part of the spectrum. Upon the presence of a PU in this part of the spectrum, however, the SU has to switch to another available spectrum band by performing spectrum handoff, avoiding interference with the PU transmission. The development of CR technology leads to a new communications paradigm called dynamic spectrum access (DSA), which relaxes the traditional fixed spectrum assignment policy and allows a CR network to temporally "borrow" a part of the spectrum from a primary network. As a consequence, the scarce spectrum resources are shared, in a highly efficient and resilient fashion, between the primary network and the CR network.
Among all the key technical problems of CR networks, security is a crucial but not well addressed issue. Due to the nature of DSA and the fact that a CR network should not interact with a primary network, the SUs in a CR network usually lack global information about the usage of the spectrum resource in the network. This makes the CR network vulnerable to attacks by hostile users. In all the main functionalities of CR networks such as spectrum sensing, spectrum mobility, spectrum sharing, and spectrum management, the CR network has been shown to be strategically vulnerable [1] . The typical attacks on CR networks may include denial of service (DoS) attacks, system penetration, repudiation, spoofing, authorization violation, malware infection, and data modification. These attacks cause potential threats to the information confidentiality, integrity, and availability of a CR network. Effective defense approaches are urgently needed to secure CR networks and deal with these attacks. Nowadays, security threats and their countermeasures have been studied as one of the most important topics in the research area of CR technology [6] .
In this article, we mainly focus on the security problem arising from primary user emulation (PUE) attacks in CR networks. PUE attacks are known as a new type of attack unique to CR networks. In such an attack, the hostile user takes advantage of the inherent etiquette in CR networks (a legitimate SU has to evacuate the spectrum band upon the arrival of a PU). An attacker emulates the PU's transmitting signal and misleads the legitimate SU to give up the spectrum band. The presence of PUE attacks may severely influence the performance of CR networks. This article aims to present a comprehensive introduction to PUE attacks, from the attacking principle and its impact on CR networks, to the detection and defense approaches. In order to secure CR networks, we propose a database-assisted detection approach and an admission-control-based defense approach against PUE attacks.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. We illustrate the principles of PUE attacks, and introduce its classification and impacts on CR networks. A quantitative analysis of the performance degradation of a CR network due to a PUE attack is also presented. We describe existing detection measures for PUE attacks. A two-level database-assisted detection approach is proposed. Energy detection and location verification are combined for both fast and reliable detection. We discuss the defense approaches against PUE attacks, where guard-channel-based admission control is adopted to defend against PUE attacks. Finally, the conclusions of the article are presented. radio transmission frequency to mimic a primary signal, thereby misguiding legitimate SUs to erroneously identify the attackers as a PU. Figure 1 shows a typical scenario of a PUE attack. There are two spectrum bands, say, licensed bands I and II. Each of the spectrum bands has six channels, indexed by frequencies f 1 , f 2 , …, f 6 , and f 7 , f 8 , …, f 12 , respectively. Let us consider the first example in band I, where the primary base station (BS) is transmitting in channels f 1 , f 3 , and f 4 to the PU receivers. Channels f 2 , f 5 , and f 6 are idle. By observing this, SU 1 , SU 2 , and SU 3 are allowed to use these three idle channels for transmission. However, the appearance of a PUE attacker, say, EU 2 , may block the SUs from using an idle channel. EU 2 may, for example, mimic the primary signal in channel f 2 . Once the attack succeeds, SU 1 and SU 3 are misled to evacuate channel f 2 , and the link between them is interrupted. The second example is shown in band II. The primary network is occupying channels f 11 and f 12 , while SU 4 and SU 5 are using channels f 9 and f 10 , respectively. PUE attackers EU 3 and EU 4 are emulating the primary signals in channels f 7 and f 8 , respectively. In this situation, suppose that SU 4 and SU 5 need to find channels to connect with the cognitive base station (BS). If attackers EU 3 and EU 4 cannot be correctly identified, SU 4 and SU 5 will find no vacant channels and hence may not be able to communicate with the cognitive BS.
The above two examples describe two different attack cases. The first example illustrates the case in which the PUE attacker attacks the in-service SUs and seizes one of their channels, causing interruption of some of the SU services. The second example illustrates the case in which the PUE attackers occupy the idle channels and waste the spectrum opportunities of the SUs.
clAssIfIcAtIon of AttAckErs
Since the security problem caused by PUE attacks was identified, different types of PUE attacks have been studied. We now introduce different types of PUE attackers associated with their classification criteria.
Selfish and Malicious Attackers: A selfish attacker aims to steal bandwidth from legitimate SUs for its own transmission. The attacker monitors the spectrum. Once an unoccupied spectrum band is discovered, it competes with the legitimate SUs by emulating the primary signal (e.g., SU 3 and SU 4 in Fig. 1) . A selfish attacker is a rational attacker in the sense that if it is detected by the legitimate SUs and the SUs reclaim the spectrum opportunity by switching back to the band, it has to leave the band. The purpose of a malicious attacker, however, is to disturb the DSA of legitimate SUs but not to exploit the spectrum for its own transmission. Being different from a selfish attacker, the malicious attacker may emulate a primary signal in both an unoccupied spectrum band and a band currently used by legitimate SUs (e.g., SU 2 in Fig. 1 ). When an attacker attacks a band being used by a legitimate SU, there is the possibility that the SU fails to discover the signal, and hence, interference occurs between the attacker and the legitimate SU.
Power-Fixed and Power-Adaptive Attackers: The ability to emulate the power levels of a primary signal is crucial for PUE attackers, because most SUs employ an energy detection technique in spectrum sensing. A power-fixed attacker uses an invariable predefined power level regardless of the actual transmitting power of the PUs and the surrounding radio environment. Compared to the power-fixed attacker, the power-adaptive attacker is smarter in the sense that it can adjust its transmitting power according to the estimated transmitting power of the primary signal and the channel parameters [3] . Specifically, the attacker employs an estimation technique and a learning method against the detection by the legitimate SUs. It is demonstrated that such an advanced attack can defeat a naive defense approach that focuses only on the received signal power.
Static and Mobile Attackers: The location of a signal source is also a key characteristic to verify the identity of an attacker. A static attacker has a fixed location that does not change in all rounds of attacks. By using positioning techniques such as time of arrival (ToA) or dedicated positioning sensors [8] , the location of a static attacker could be revealed. A static attacker can easily be recognized due to the difference between its location and that of the PUs. A mobile attacker will constantly change its location so that it is difficult to trace and discover. A viable detection approach that exploits the correlations between RF signals and acoustic information is proposed in [4] to verify the existence of a mobile PUE attacker.
EssEntIAl condItIons for succEssful PuE AttAcks
In a CR network, the successful realization of a PUE attack relies on several essential conditions. To better understand PUE attacks and facilitate the design of countermeasures, we summarize these essential conditions as follows.
No PU-SU interaction: There is no interaction between the primary and secondary networks. This is a necessary condition for a successful PUE attack. Otherwise, if the legitimate SUs are allowed to exchange information with the PUs, a PU verification procedure could be designed Licensed band II {f 7 , f 8 , f 9 , f 10 Primary signal learning and channel measurement: To emulate the primary signal, the attacker has to track and learn the characteristics of the primary signal. For an advanced attack, the attacker may also estimate the power level as well as the channel conditions to generate trickier transmitting signals.
Avoiding interference with the primary network: Although this is usually a primary concern for SUs, it is also an important condition with which PUE attackers have to comply. The attackers, especially selfish ones, should carefully monitor the behaviors of PUs so as not to cause extra interference with the primary network.
ImPAct of PuE AttAcks on cr nEtworks
The presence of PUE attacks causes a number of problems for CR networks. The list of potential consequences of PUE attacks is below.
Bandwidth waste: The ultimate objective of deploying CR networks is to address the spectrum underutilization that is caused by the current fixed spectrum usage policy. By dynamically accessing spectrum holes, SUs are able to retrieve these otherwise wasted spectrum resources. However, PUE attackers may steal the spectrum holes from the SUs, leading to spectrum bandwidth waste again.
QoS degradation: The appearance of a PUE attack may severely degrade the quality of service (QoS) of the CR network by destroying the continuity of secondary services. For instance, a malicious attacker could disturb the ongoing services and force the SUs to constantly change their operating spectrum bands. Frequent spectrum handoff will induce unsatisfying delay [7] and jitter for secondary services.
Connection unreliability: If a real-time secondary service is attacked by a PUE attacker and finds no available channel when performing spectrum handoff, the service has to be dropped. This realtime service is then terminated due to the PUE attack. In principle, the secondary services in CR networks inherently have no guarantee that they will have stable radio resource because of the nature of DSA. The existence of PUE attacks significantly increases the connection unreliability of CR networks.
Denial of service: Consider PUE attacks with high attacking frequency; then the attackers may occupy many of the spectrum opportunities. The SUs will have insufficient bandwidth for their transmissions, and hence, some of the SU services will be interrupted. In the worst case, the CR network may even find no channels to set up a common control channel for delivering the control messages. As a consequence, the CR network will be suspended and unable to serve any SU. This is called denial of service (DoS) in CR networks.
Interference with the primary network: Although a PUE attacker is motivated to steal the bandwidth from the SUs, there is the chance that the attacker generates additional interference with the primary network. This happens when the attacker fails to detect the occurrence of a PU. On the other hand, when the SUs are tackling a PUE attack, it is also possible to incorrectly identify the true PU as the attacker and interfere with the primary network. In any case, causing interference with the primary network is strictly forbidden in CR networks.
PErformAncE dEgrAdAtIon duE to PuE AttAcks
We adopt the term saturation to characterize the state of a CR network in which all the channels are occupied by PUs, SUs, and PUE attackers (i.e., there are no idle channels) and the term outage to characterize the state of a CR network in which there is no spectrum band available for the common control channel (CCC). In a practical CR network, it is necessary to build up a CCC for exchanging control messages. The CCC might be established by using a dedicated radio transceiver and setting up an out-of-band fixed channel. However, this is very difficult in a real CR network due to the additional cost of hardware and the assignment of a dedicated spectrum band. It is more likely that the CCC would be constructed by means of DSA. This implies that the CR network needs to maintain a stable channel as its CCC. Under PUE attacks, the CCC may also be attacked and disconnected. The system will be suspended in this case. Two new performance metrics are defined as follows.
• Outage probability: The outage probability is defined as the probability that a CR network stays in the outage state in which there is no available spectrum band for constructing a CCC.
• System recovery time: The system recovery time is defined as the average time duration that a CR network (in the outage state) takes to acquire an available spectrum band as a CCC for delivering control messages. Figure 2 shows the saturation state and the outage state transition. When the current CCC is not available anymore due to the arrival of a PU or a PUE attack, it has to switch to a new channel. Since the CCC has priority over the other common SUs, it could switch to any one of the available channels, even one already occupied by the SUs. As a consequence, the CCC is disconnected only in the case that all of the channels are occupied by PUs or PUE attackers. In the saturation states with only one SU channel being used as the CCC, if a PU arrives and occupies the CCC, or a PUE attacker successfully attacks the CCC, the CR network transits to the outage state.
We adopt the term saturation to characterize the state of a CR network in which all the channels are occupied by PUs, SUs, and PUE attackers (i.e., there are no idle channels) and the term outage to characterize the state of a CR network in which there is no spectrum band available for the common control channel. Figure 3 shows the outage probability and the system recovery time in terms of the PUE attacking strength (i.e., the attack arrival rate). In the figure, λ EU and μ EU denote the PUE attacker arrival rates and the PUE attacker departure rate, respectively. It is observed that both the outage probability and the system recovery time increase dramatically with the increase of attack strength. Without PUE attacks, the outage probability is near zero and the recovery time is very short. In the case of a PUE attack, say, λ EU = 0.4 and μ EU = 0.1, the outage probability is over 0.3 percent, and the recovery time is nearly 2 ms. Hence, the outage probability increases dramatically, and the recovery time is substantially extended compared to the case when there are no PUE attacks. These observations indicate that the existence of PUE attacks may seriously degrade the performance of a CR network. Detection and defense approaches against PUE attacks are becoming very critical to secure CR networks.
dEtEctIon APProAchEs for PuE AttAcks ExIstIng dEtEctIon APProAchEs
In the literature, some detection approaches against PUE attacks have been presented. The existing detection approaches can be classified into energy detection, received signal strength (RSS)-based detection, feature detection, location verification, and cooperative detection.
1. Energy Detection: Energy detection is a simple but widely used approach for spectrum sensing in CR networks. It is also one of the basic approaches for the detection of PUE attacks. By measuring the power level of the received signal at the SU receiver and comparing it to that from the true PUs, the CR network could judge whether the signal comes from an attacker or not. However, a pure energy detector is not robust enough to tackle an advanced PUE attack.
RSS-Based Detection:
The RSS-based detection approach is discussed in [5] , where the authors analyze a PUE attack in a CR network without using any location information. Thus, this detection approach does not need dedicated sensor networks. The PUE attackers are assumed to be distributed randomly around the SUs. The authors present an analysis using Fenton's approximation and Wald's sequential probability ratio test (WSPRT) to detect PUE attacks.
3. Feature Detection: The approach proposed in [9] uses energy detection to identify the existing users in the frequency band. The approach then employs a cyclostationary calculation to represent the features of the user signals, which are then fed into an artificial neural network for classification. As opposed to current techniques for detecting PUE attacks in CR networks, this approach does not require additional hardware or time synchronization algorithms in the wireless network.
4. Location Verification: Two location verification schemes are proposed in [2] . They are called distance ratio test (DRT) and distance difference test (DDT). In both schemes, dedicated cognitive nodes (SUs or a cognitive BS) with enhanced functionality are involved for location verification. DRT uses an RSS-based method, where two dedicated cognitive nodes measure the RSS of the signal source and calculate the ratio of these two RSSs to check whether it coincides with their distances to the true PU (e.g., a TV broadcast tower). Using DDT, the arrival time of the transmitted signal from the source is measured by the two dedicated cognitive nodes. The product of the time difference and the light speed is then compared to the distance difference from the true PU to the two dedicated nodes in order to identify the source.
A dAtAbAsE-AssIstEd dEtEctIon APProAch Figure 4 shows our proposed database-assisted PUE attack detection approach, which has three key components: multithreshold fast energy detection, fingerprint-based location verification and a two-level database. In the approach, a local database is integrated in each SU, while a global database is built up in the cognitive BS. The local database is used to store historical spectrum sensing data and the local detection decisions of each SU. The global database is used to collect and record all the SUs' spectrum sensing data and local detection decisions, as well as the global detection decisions. If the proposed approach is applied in wireless regional area networks, according to IEEE 802.22 [10] , the global database in a cognitive BS can provide an interface to the incumbent database for information query (e.g., the geolocation of a primary BS and the list of available channels). The main operations of the proposed detection approach are explained as follows.
Basic Operations: We consider a system model in which there are one primary BS (e.g., the TV broadcasting tower) and multiple PUE attackers. In our model the attackers are static or quasi-static (e.g., moving very slowly). In a given moment and in a specific spectrum band (channel), only one of the attackers, at most, will emulate a primary signal.
In the proposed approach, there are four main units in the SU: a signal pre-processing unit, a fast energy detector, a location verifier, and a local database. The local database consists of two components: an RSS probability density function (PDF) database and a fingerprint database. The signal pre-processing unit gets the received signal r(t) from the RF unit as input. Let x(t), h(t), and ω(t) denote the transmitted signal, channel impulse response, and receiver thermal noise, respectively. Let s(t) and s′(t) denote the real PU signal and the PUE attack signal, respectively. Then the transmitted signal x(t) = s(t) for the real PU signal, x(t) = s′(t) for the PUE attack signal, and x(t) = 0 when no signal is transmitted. The input signal is given by r(t) = x(t) * h(t) + ω (t). Let {t n } denote the sequence of sampling times and N s the number of samples in one sensing period. [n] . After that, the aggregated energy E is sent to the fast energy detector for comparison to the preset thresholds λ k 's. If the comparison result indicates that there is no signal or it is a PUE attack signal, the detection procedure is terminated and the corresponding decision is made. Otherwise, the energy vector e[n], containing more detailed energy information, is sent to the location verification unit. The location of the source of the signal is estimated using Bayesian hypothesis testing. The estimated location m of the signal source is then transmitted to the cognitive BS for data fusion. The operations of fast energy detector and location verifier are elaborated below.
Multiple-Thresholds-Based Fast Energy Detection: The goal of a fast energy detector is to quickly react to possible PUE attacks. The basic idea of a fast energy detector stems from conventional energy detection. In a conventional energy detector, there is only one energy threshold, to distinguish the cases of presence or absence of a primary signal. This single-threshold detector is not efficient for detecting a PUE attack signal. To distinguish a PUE attacker from a real PU, a fast energy detector sets up three energy thresholds, denoted by γ 0 , γ 1 , and γ 2 . Here, γ 0 < γ 1 < γ 2 , and γ 0 is according to the original threshold in a conventional energy detector. If the input E < γ 0 , it is decided that there is no PU or PUE attacker present. The two new thresholds, γ 1 and γ 2 , are used to distinguish the signals of PU and PUE attacker. If the input γ 0 < E < γ 1 or E > γ 2 , it is decided that a PUE attack is detected. Otherwise, the received signal is initially diagnosed to be a PU signal. The location verifier will be launched for further examination. It is emphasized tha, using two energy thresholds to distinguish a PU from a PUE attacker is justified by the following fact. A PUE attacker tries to emulate the transmitting power of a real PU. However, it is very difficult for the attacker to fabricate a signal so that all of the SUs receive the signal with a power level similar to that of the real PU. By randomly assigning a few SUs to measure the received signal power, and letting these SUs know the signal power of the real PUs, a PUE attack could be discovered with a high probability.
Generally, the received energy E has the form of a Chi-Square distribution. Since the number of samples is large in most cases, we can use the central limit theorem (CLT) to approximate the Chi-Square distribution by a Gaussian distribution. Let H 0 , H 1 , and H′ 1 denote the hypothesis of receiving no signal, a real PU signal, and a PUE attack signal, respectively. Let P d (γ 1 , γ 2 ) and P f (γ 1 , γ 2 ) denote the PUE attack detection and false alarm probabilities, respectively. We have
Data-Fusion-Driven Location Verification: The proposed location verification does not need any dedicated positioning sensors [8] . In particular, suppose that the global database has recorded the location fingerprints of M PUE attackers as well as that of the real PU. The location verification will specifically identify the source of the received signal from the real PU and the PUE attackers. The location verification consists of three main steps. In step one, the SUs observe the input energy vector e and estimate the location of the source by finding the best matching entry in their local databases. In step two, the SUs send the estimated location to the cognitive BS for data fusion. The cognitive BS makes a final decision and identifies the signal source. In step three, the cognitive BS updates the global database according to the gathered fingerprinting information from the multiple SUs. Update information is also sent to the SUs' local databases.
The location estimation using Bayesian hypothesis testing is described as follows. Let L m (m = 0, 1, 2, …, M) denote the location of the signal source, where L 0 corresponds to the real PU and L {1,2,…,M} correspond to the attackers, respectively. The input energy vector e follows a parameterized PDF with the parameter stored in the database. Specifically, the PDF of e under the hypothesis that the source is located in L m is denoted f(e|L m ). The estimation of the location of the source of the signal is given bŷ
where π m is the a priori probability of the hypothesis that the source is located in L m . The estimated location m is sent as the local decision to the cognitive BS for data fusion. The data fusion rules that lead to various global decisions are explained below: 
• True PU: If all local decisions are identical and L 0 (i.e. m = 0), the cognitive BS will decide that the signal source is the true PU.
• PUE attack in a known location: If all local decisions are identical and m ∈ L {1,2,⋅⋅⋅,M} , the cognitive BS will decide that the source is the PUE attacker in location L m .
• PUE attack in a new location: If the local decisions are different, the cognitive BS will decide that the source is a PUE attacker in a new location. A new fingerprint entry is added to the global database.
The final decision will be sent by the cognitive BS to the SUs. Both the local and global databases will be updated when a PUE attack is detected by either the fast energy detector or the location verifier. In particular, in the fast energy detector, the energy thresholds will be recomputed. In the location verifier, the PDFs of the energy vector will be updated. In addition, if a new location of a PUE attacker is detected, a new profile will be created to track this new attacker. The communication overheads to update the two-level database is proportional to the frequency of PUE attacks. The computational complexity in detecting PUE attacks is determined by the number of samples in each spectrum sensing and the number of possible locations of the PUE attackers. The overall computational complexity is O(MN s ), which is sufficiently low for practical deployment.
Illustrative Result: We consider a scenario where there are three PUE attackers located in positions L 1 , L 2 , and L 3 , respectively. The SUs are distributed in a circular field with radius 1 km. The primary BS is located in the center, while L 1 , L 2 , and L 3 are 100 m, 200 m, and 300 m away from the center, respectively. Figure 5 demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed detection approach. The PUE attack detection probability is shown in terms of the false alarm probability. In this example, we have shown two cases when the sampling parameter varies. The comparison indicates that more samples lead to higher detection probability. We can observe that the farther the PUE attacker is located from the primary BS, the easier it is to detect it. For example, when N s = 12 and P f = 0.1 percent, the PUE attack detection probabilities are 0.93, 0.95, and 0.97 when the PUE attacks are performed from locations L 1 , L 2 , and L 3 , respectively. The results indicate that the proposed approach works effectively and is able to successfully detect the attacks.
dEfEnsE APProAchEs AgAInst PuE AttAcks
Defense against PUE attacks is an important but seldom explored topic in CR networks. There are practical requirements for efficient PUE attack defense approaches. We illustrate this by two examples below. First, although a variety of PUE attack detection approaches have been proposed, none of the existing approaches is able to promise accurate detection of all attacks. There is still a chance that some attacks are not detected. This necessitates system-level mechanisms to maintain the overall performance of a CR network under undetected PUE attacks. Second, when there are malicious attackers in the network, their purpose is to interrupt the communications of the cognitive users. Even if they have been discovered, malicious attackers may stil transmit in order to interfere with the transmissions of the SUs. In this case, the signal processing units in the RF frontends of the SU receivers should be applied to get rid of the interference signals in order to try to recover the secondary signal.
dEfEnsE APProAchEs At VArIous Protocol lAyErs
To defend against PUE attacks, effective countermeasures could be taken at different layers of the communications protocol stack.
Physical-layer approach: Physical-layer techniques such as source separation, signal design, spread spectrum, and directional antennas could be employed to deal with the intended interference from malicious PUE attackers. The key in the design of an efficient physical-layer countermeasure is to exploit the a priori knowledge about the characteristics of the primary signal and its dissimilarity with the interference signal. 
Medium access control (MAC)-layer approach: Undetected PUE attacks will steal bandwidth from the CR network. To let the SUs maintain moderate QoS performance, radio resource management (RRM) strategies such as admission control, spectrum handoff, and spectrum scheduling should be studied.
Network-layer approach: In cognitive ad hoc networks, once the locations of the PUE attackers are estimated, a position-based cognitive routing strategy could be employed to deal with the PUE attacks. Those SUs that are located within the attacking range of the PUE attackers should be considered to be temporary unavailable. Endto-end routing paths should be established without crossing the unavailable SU nodes.
Cross-layer approach: A cross-layer design framework may be set up to defend against PUE attacks. In the framework, the behavior of the detected PUE attacks is observed at the physical layer and reported to the upper layers, such as the RRM mechanism at the MAC layer or the routing mechanism at the network layer. We emphasize that even undetected PUE attacks could be estimated in the physical layer by considering the theoretically derived detection probability. The control parameters of the upper layer are jointly optimized considering the existence of PUE attacks.
AdmIssIon control to dEfEnd AgAInst PuE AttAcks
In CR networks, due to the nature of dynamic spectrum access, ongoing SU services may be forced to be dropped in the presence of PUs. When a CR network suffers from PUE attacks, the phenomenon of dropping will be severely magnified, leading to the discontinuity of SU services. A guard channel (GC) is a simple but effective approach to protect the ongoing services in a wireless network. In this article, we propose a GC-based admission control strategy to defend against PUE attacks. Upon the arrival of PUs or PUE attackers (if not detected), the ongoing services have to perform spectrum handoff. The handoff services need to aquire new available channels to resume transmission. Similar to conventional GCs, the proposed approach reserves a certain portion of the available channels for the handoff services. Once an SU needs a new channel for transmission, it has to send a request message to the cognitive BS, applying for an available channel. The cognitive BS observes the remaining available channels. If the number of available channels is larger than the reservation number, the SU is allocated a new available channel. Otherwise, the SU's request is denied. The proposed GC strategy takes into account the existence of PUE attacks, and has considered channel reservation for the PUE attacks. Hence, the dropping rate caused by PUE attacks could be significantly alleviated. Figure 6 compares the feature-based PUEA detection [9] without admission control and the feature-based PUEA detection with admission control. The results show that the introduction of admission control is able to significantly reduce the dropping rate. It is clear that the admission-control-based mechanism can significantly reduce the dropping rate. For instance, when P d = 0.9 and λ EU = 0.8, the dropping rate is about 1.8  10 -3 without admission control, while it is only about 6.2  10 -5 with admission control. Consequently, the proposed admission-control-based scheme can be applied as an efficient defense approach.
conclusIon
This article focuses on the PUE attack security problem in CR networks. A comprehensive introduction to PUE attacks is presented and several technical challenges are discussed, including classification of attackers, conditions for successful PUE attacks, and impacts of PUE attacks on CR networks. After that, a database-assisted detection approach is proposed to efficiently discover PUE attacks. Multi-threshold fast energy detection and fingerprint-based location verification are integrated and driven by a two-level database. In addition, an admission-control-based defense approach is proposed to alleviate the impact of PUE attacks on the performance of CR networks. By reserving a portion of channels for the handoff services, the dropping rate induced by successful PUE attacks could evidently be reduced. Illustrative results demonstrate that the reported detection and defense approaches are effective in discovering and defending against PUE attacks in CR networks. Even the undetected PUE attacks could be estimated in the physical layer by considering the theoretically derived detection probability. The control parameters of the upper layer are jointly optimized considering the existence of PUE attacks.
